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Foucault’s works can be critical of cultural practices in the contemporary West when his
accounts take the form of descriptive history. Commentaries offered heretofore have been
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they have failed to articulate the relation of the genealogist to her present normative context
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, I argue for a new way to articulate Foucauldian genealogy. In the secondary
literature on the work of Michel Foucault there has been much dispute over whether, and how,
his historical works are critical of practices within contemporary Western culture (e.g. penal
institutions, psychiatry, psychology, ethnology, and political activism regarding norms of
sexuality). Much of the dispute has revolved around how to understand the sort of criticisms
Foucault offers in his histories. On the one hand, if we understand Foucault to be openly
objecting to such cultural practices, then it is difficult to situate the normative basis for the
criticism within his account. On the other hand, if we resist attributing openly, or fully, critical
intentions to Foucault, then we have trouble explaining his critical-sounding passages and,
thereby, the overall import of his projects.1 This dilemma has led many to reject Foucauldian
genealogy entirely, while others have sought more complex philosophical explanations of
Foucauldian “critique.”
I argue that attempts to escape this dilemma so far have failed and that there is a more
plausible alternative available. I show that many have supposed, wrongly, that Foucault’s
criticisms are intended to proffer universal and necessary grounds for critique. Assuming
Foucault intends to ground a timeless critical project prevents us from articulating the basis for
Foucault’s criticisms of present practices. A more appropriate approach is to first question how
Foucault understands his historical accounts to relate to the norms of the present context in
which he writes. Instead of looking for ways that Foucault can legitimate a normative framework

1

This question has been brought up in two distinct ways. The first is as a problem for Foucault’s ability to
offer a neutral, objective historical account. The second is a problem with grounding criticism within these histories.
In the body of this thesis I will be concerned solely with the latter problem. Ultimately, however, a robust treatment
of this latter problem will bring us back to the former in the conclusion (see pp.55 ff.).
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for “critique,” I will argue that his goal is to criticize certain present day practices by showing
these practices to conflict with the value-commitments that his audience already holds.
Foucault’s work challenges the timeless and unquestionable nature of our present practices and
values by constructing an account of the formation of these values and practices in history.
Removing this timeless status makes possible a critique of these practices. And after opening up
these practices and values to the possibility of being criticized, Foucault orients these practices
within other value-commitments of his audience so as to render the practices suspicious to his
audience. Put another way, Foucauldian genealogy confronts the seemingly unquestionable
norms of the present by, first, historicizing them and, second, confronting them with other values
shared between him and his audience.
In order to unpack my proposed understanding of Foucauldian critique, it will be
necessary first to develop the difficulty that Foucauldian genealogy is thought to face and then to
explain why prior attempts to resolve this difficulty have come up short. In the remainder of this
chapter, I will motivate this concern with the grounds for Foucault’s objections to cultural
practices. In chapter two, I will offer an example of Foucauldian genealogy. In chapter three, I
will motivate my account by showing the inadequacies of older, more familiar models of
criticizing practices. Then, in chapter four, I will lay out in detail and defend my proposed
understanding of “genealogical critique.”
Historiographical Corruption
In the 1970s, Michel Foucault began referring to his historical and philosophical projects
as “genealogies.” In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (NGH), Foucault offers his only explicit
methodological reflection on what he calls genealogy. Foucault’s discussion of Nietzsche in
NGH is primarily an argument concerning what constitutes proper historiography. Foucault
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describes Nietzsche as giving arguments against a writing of history that involves “the search for
‘origins’.” 2 According to Foucault, Nietzsche is chiefly concerned with pointing out the problem
with appealing to entities outside the domain of historical events when writing history.3 This
appeal to extra-historical entities when writing history is what Focuault calls the search for
“origins.” An origin, Foucault explains, is a point in time at which “metahistorical” norms are
taken to enter history.4 These norms, as metahistorical, are abstract entities that can neither be
found in nor reduced to history.

2

Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and
Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (New York: The New Press, 1998),
370.
3

Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche may be up for question. Foucault identifies himself heavily with
Nietzsche (see, for example, Michel Foucault, "On the Ways of Writing History," in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics,
Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (New York: The New
Press, 1998), 294; and Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism," in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics,
Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (New York: The New
Press, 1998), 447). And insofar as he explicitly adopts a historical method he finds in Nietzsche, his reading of
Nietzsche is very illuminating for understanding his own work. Whether Foucault gets Nietzsche right, of course, is
a question for Nietzsche scholarship. It is sufficient for my purposes to take Foucault’s portrayal of Nietzsche at face
value as a reflection on the genealogical method Foucault takes up.
4

The term “norm,” as I am using it here and throughout this thesis, is standing in for a complex relation of
power-structures and knowledge or facts. In their classic text on Foucault, Dreyfus and Rabinow offer a concise
description of this complex relationship: On the one hand, “[p]ower is a general matrix of force relations at a given
time, in a given society.” These relations are unequal, some persons are in advantageous positions over others, but
they are more nuanced and entrenched in our culture than the sort of power a sovereign wields over subjects. These
relations are constituted by “micropractices” (such as “rigid scheduling, separation of pupils, surveillance of
sexuality, ranking, individuation, and so on”) in which so much of our lives are deeply enmeshed. “For Foucault,
unless these unequal relations of power are traced down to their actual material functioning, they escape our analysis
and continue to operate with unquestioned autonomy” (Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault,
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 186). On the other
hand, “knowledge is one of the defining components for the operation of power in the modern world.” Distributions
of power make possible certain forms of knowledge, and yet power also presupposes knowledge. “But power and
knowledge are not identical with each other…. [Foucault] attempts to show the specificity and materiality of their
interconnections. They have a correlative, not a causal relationship, which must be determined in its historical
specificity. This mutual production of power and knowledge is one of Foucault’s major contributions” (Dreyfus and
Rabinow, 203).
In chapter two, I will discuss a particular example of this mutual production of power and knowledge,
without dedicating much space to elaborating this relationship. The example is that of “sexuality,” which is a
product of history but one that is placed within discourse as a metahistorical norm. Foucault is interested in
analyzing the place that this norm comes to take in the power structures and discourses of knowledge in our society.
But he is also interested in showing the historically contingent nature of this location and, in turn, of the very notion
of sexuality itself. “Norm” will suffice to refer to the location of sexuality in Foucault’s analyses.
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The search for origins takes one of two forms. First, it can look in the past for principles
to order the succession of events that constitute history. For example, one might look in the past
for the origin of physical science. Such a history would look for an original instance of
contemporary physics—for instance, Isaac Newton—and attempt to show how physics can be
seen as a linear development from that original instance. This sort of history would seek the
essence of the modern discipline of physics in that originary instance exemplified by Newton. To
engage in such a search is to offer a transcendental history. The second form of the search for
origins is a search for some present or future end as the point of reference for analysis and an
interpretation of the historical succession of events that constitute history as progressing toward
this end. Consider as an example a theoretical physics that expresses all operations of matter and
energy in terms of internally-coherent mathematical models—models that are often thought to be
so successful because they get at something essential about the physical universe. This latter
form of the search for origins would describe the events of the past as slowly working to
culminate in these successful explanatory models. This sort of history would give descriptions of
past events as partial successes insofar as they resemble, more and more, the present—or future
—ideal physical models. To offer this sort of account is to offer a teleological history. In both
transcendental and teleological histories, particular points in time—past, present, or future
respectively—are taken by the historian as grounding metahistorical norms—in my example, the
norms of successful physical science—in temporal events.5

5

It is important to distinguish metahistorical norms from the historical norms of the present. All writing of
history involves appeal to the latter, or so it may be argued. After all, the historian is caught up in a certain,
historically contingent culture with values and beliefs unique to that point in time. But such an appeal is distinct
from appealing to the former in at least two ways. First, the historian whose understanding of the past depends on
her epistemic and normative position in the present need not assume that her present condition transcends history in
any way. Second, the historian who engages in a search for origins does more than attribute timelessness to entities.
She also attempts to ground these timeless entities in time, i.e. in the events that constitute history.

5
Both sorts of historiography are prevalent. The point Foucault highlights in NGH is that
these histories are unwarranted; they rely on metaphysical assumptions that can never, in
principle, be borne out by examining past events. Nietzsche, according to Foucault, thinks that
historians who search for origins (a) must presuppose metahistorical norms as principles of order
and unity regulating the events that constitute their object of investigation and, at the same time,
(b) search for past events that mark the introduction of these metahistorical norms into historical
time.6 The essence of physical science—although offering some assistance in ordering the
writing of history—is something that can never be found in past or future events. The
metahistorical norms have to be taken as given before such a history is possible. Thus, all
historians who search for origins are offering—or, more accurately, assuming—metaphysical
assertions and are, therefore, doing something more than writing history. On Foucault’s reading,
Nietzsche understands the search for such origins in history—which amounts to a postulation of
these origins in history—to be a historiographical corruption, since it brings in unjustified
metaphysical assumptions.
Genealogical Critique
According to Foucault, Nietzschean genealogy “will never confuse itself with a quest
for…‘origins,’ will never neglect as inaccessible all the episodes of history. On the contrary, it
will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning.” 7 In other words, by
refraining from analyzing past events in terms of metahistorical ordering principles, the
genealogist can take seriously the historical status of past events and analyze them without
engaging in metaphysics. And by refraining from metahistorical postulates and limiting analysis
to historical norms, genealogy purports to make possible the recognition of the historical
6

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 370-73.

7

Ibid, 370-73.
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contingency of present norms. This amounts to a historicization of the same norms others try to
universalize by the search for origins.
This last point is especially significant. Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s argument
against the search for origins is twofold and wholly historical. Metahistorical norms are
necessarily unaffected by the changes of history—that’s what it means to say that they are
metahistorical. The result of this immutability of metahistorical norms is that, if writing history is
an analysis of the succession of past events, then the historiographer does not attribute timeless
to the succeeding events and, therefore, nothing recorded by such a history is metahistorical. The
inquirer of origins attempts to situate metahistorical norms within the succession of past, present
and/or future events. But to do so, she must write about something that lies beyond the field of
historical analysis—she must write about something outside past, passing, or oncoming events.
Thus, the search for origins can reach metahistorical norms only by bringing such norms into
history from outside a consideration of past events—no historical analysis can reveal these
norms as anything other than contingent norms. Thus far, however, the only conclusion reached
is that historical analysis fails to legitimate the metahistoricity of particular norms.
Searching for origins collapses into making metaphysical assertions about norms in
history. And this is where Foucault’s positive understanding of Nietzschean historiography
comes in. Nietzsche also attempts to identify the “historical beginnings” of certain norms—i.e.
the first time that a given, would-be metahistorical norm comes into play. Indeed, the genealogist
may very well identify as a historical beginning the same events that the metaphysician picks out
as the past origin. But once these norms have been located within the succession of past events,
the genealogist is in a position to deny the metahistoricity of the norms in question. He does so
by revealing the production of these very norms by contingent and prior cultural practices. If a
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given, would-be metahistorical norm can be shown to have been produced by past events, then
its metahistoricity would become questionable if not utterly implausible. And thus, history not
only fails to offer a legitimization of such metahistorical norms, it also dissolves their
metahistorical status by revealing their dependence on past events.
This exact sort of genealogical historicism occupies much of Foucault’s work, especially
in the 1970s. Yet, there is another element in his work that cannot be adequately described in
terms of positive historiography, an element that seems in tension with the historicity just
described—a critical element.8
Just as Foucault’s genealogical element is brought out well in his essay on Nietzsche,
Foucault’s critical element is brought out in an essay he wrote on Kant a few years later entitled
“What is Enlightenment?” In this essay, Foucault discusses Kant’s reflection on the
Enlightenment in order to think through his own discourse. The connection he sees between
himself and Kant consists in an inherited “philosophical ethos that could be described as a
permanent critique of our historical era.” This ethos is an attitude of disaffection with the current
limits on possible ways of being (i.e. possible ways of valuing, knowing, and behaving) imposed
by our culture. This ethos is not equivalent to a commitment to a particular set of doctrines or
values such as those given the title “humanism.” Neither is it to be equated with a transcendental
critique. Rather, this ethos is merely a disposition of opposition to the constraint of our present
culture.9
These negative definitions of the philosophical ethos of the Enlightenment point toward
the tension I am concerned with in this thesis. Foucault’s work seems problematically committed
8

Even in NGH, Foucault exhibits ambivalence to what he calls “critical history.” He suggests that this is
something Nietzsche rejected early on but came back to from a new perspective. Foucault is not explicit, however,
about how Nietzsche is supposed to have reconciled this with his genealogy. See ibid, 387-91.
9

Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New
York: The New Press, 1997), 312-17.
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to a combination of Nietzschean genealogy and, loosely, Kantian critique, a combination that
seems to elude positive articulation. This is why Foucault’s sort of criticisms of cultural practices
have taken on the title: “genealogical critiques” within the secondary literature. Foucault is
clearly interested in bringing his histories to bear critically on various practices and discourses.
But Foucault is not very clear as to how we are to understand the way in which his work can be
both critical and historicist.
The Dilemma
The tension between Foucault’s critical and historicist intentions can be expressed quite
simply. In order for him to object to some practice, he must appeal to some value that the
practice transgresses—i.e. he must have some normative ground from which to object to the
practice. And, of course, in order for his objection to be persuasive, he must be able to give some
account of the ground for the value(s) to which he appeals. But if, as Foucault argues in NGH, all
values are historically contingent, Foucault is unable to offer a universal basis for the values to
which he would appeal. Moreover, it is also unclear how else Foucault can arbitrate between
conflicting values. His historicism seems to render all values—both those that he assumes as a
ground for critique and those that he wants to criticize—equally questionable (or
unquestionable); his historicism seems to eliminate the possibility of his giving an account of his
normative ground that is any more beyond question than those he criticizes. To compound this
problem, Foucault often resists articulating the values that underlie his objections. Rudi Visker
summarizes this problem well: “Either genealogy remains genealogical, but then it is hard to see
how it can be critical, or it is critical and then seems to lose its main conceptual instruments.” 10

10

Rudi Visker, "Can Genealogy Be Critical? A Somewhat Unromantic Look at Nietzsche and Foucault," in
Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments, ed. Barry Smart (New York: Routledge, 1998), 119.
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Some, including Visker, have argued that Foucault is merely offering transcendental
criticisms and fails to recognize it.11 It has also been argued that his objections are
transcendental, but in a modified way that insulates them from inconsistency.12 Still others have
argued that he is not offering a criticism in anything like the traditionally understood sense, and
that his sort of objection-making just fails to fall prey to the paradox summarized above.13
Finally, it has been argued that Foucault’s ability to be both genealogical and critical was
misguided in his work of the 1970s, and that Foucault had to rethink his methodology in order to
escape this inconsistency.14
I will argue in what follows that all of these attempts to understand Foucault’s
genealogical critique fail to account for Foucauldian critique and do so because they overlook the
genealogist’s relation to the normative commitments of the present. The reason Foucault
describes genealogical critique as “permanent” or constantly “beginning again” is because it is
engaged in a continual process of calling into question certain clusters of practices, and the
would-be metahistorical norms that underpin these clusters, from the vantage of other shared
values within its current context. Foucault is first concerned with tearing down the pretenses of
objectivity and universality of certain contemporary norms, and this destructive work enables
him to present descriptions of these norms in such a way that they are seen as dangerous or
11

See, especially, Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans.
Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Rudi Visker, Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique,
trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1995); and Visker, "Can Genealogy Be Critical? A Somewhat Unromantic
Look at Nietzsche and Foucault."
12

See, especially, Beatrice Han-Pile, "Is Early Foucault a Historian? History, History and the Analytic of
Finitude," Philosophy and Social Criticism 31, no. 5-6 (2005); and Beatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project:
Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
13

See Geuss; T. Carlos Jacques, "Whence Does the Critic Speak? A Study of Foucault's Genealogy," in
Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments, ed. Barry Smart (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Todd May, The
Philosophy of Foucault, Continental European Philosophy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press,
2006).
14

A noteworthy example of this view is Kevin Thompson, "Forms of Resistance: Foucault on Tactical
Reversal and Self-Formation," Continental Philosophy Review, no. 36 (2003).
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objectionable from the value-laden perspective of his audience. Genealogical critique does not
aim to dissolve the ahistorical status of the values propping up all practices and forms of
knowledge at once. Neither does it attempt to offer one critique to end all critiques. This
interpretation, I will argue, best accounts for Foucault’s objections and does so in a way that is
fully consistent with his genealogical commitments.

11
CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1:
AN EXAMPLE OF GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE
Repressed Sexuality
In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (HS), 15 Foucault offers a genealogy of what he
calls the “repressive hypothesis,” especially as it regards sexuality, and an objection to its place
in the politics of twentieth-century Western society.16 The repressive hypothesis claims that in
our culture there is a consciousness of sexuality as private and embarrassing, and thus unsuitable
for public discourse. And so, our culture has developed certain practices that repress our
sexuality. The current forms of repression are often identified with a prudishness that developed
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to this hypothesis, we are still
under the effects of this repression and only, imperfectly, with the work begun by Freud have we
even become aware of it. Finally, it is supposed that by enabling awareness of our sexual

15

I consider the secondary literature to have shown decisively that Discipline and Punish and HS offer a
methodological development of Foucault’s thought that is continuous with his earlier works—especially, in terms of
its historicity and critical attitude, which are the themes crucial to my account—but also importantly refined.
Whether his analyses are concerned with “discursive formations” or cultural practices, and whether the relation
between power and knowledge is articulated explicitly, are inconsequential to the issue that preoccupies this thesis.
Thus, HS serves as a helpful case to consider here, as we can expect it to exhibit a more clearly thought-through
genealogical critique that is, nonetheless, a quality exhibited by his earlier works as well. (For a thorough
examination of the methods of HS and the continuity between them and the less refined methods of Foucault’s
earlier works, see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 104-25. See also Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Thomas Flynn, "Foucault's Mapping of History," in The Cambridge Guide to
Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); May, 122-23; Joseph Rouse,
"Power/Knowledge," in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 96-97; Visker, Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique, 32-48.)
16

As others have insightfully pointed out, this rejection of the repressive hypothesis is closely connected
with a rejection of a certain theory of power—repressive power. Foucault’s rejection of this conception of power can
be seen earlier in Discipline and Punish and is commonly thought to be a positive shift in Foucault’s thought. This
shift in his analysis of power is tangential to the discussion of this thesis, and so I will not address it at length. But I
will suggest here that this shift in the analysis of power seems necessitated by Foucault’s genealogical prescripts—if
genealogy is to contest the assumption of unity among certain entities, then it does not make sense to speak of a
power that merely acts negatively against (what would need to be) unified entities—and this serves as one more
reason to turn to HS for an exemplary genealogy.
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repression, the repressive hypothesis itself can serve as a rallying point for political resistance
and, eventually, for sexual liberation.17
The repressive hypothesis understands cultural forces (e.g. scientific discourses and
institutional practices) to act upon sexuality negatively, as a repressive power. Because the
repressive act happens in time, predicating repression of an object logically requires continuity
between the object before and after the repression in question. Thus, the repressive hypothesis
supposes a continuous sexuality. This continuity can be expressed either as an originary sexuality
(a sexuality found first in the past and persisting beyond the point of repression) or as a
transhistorical rule according to which cultural forces relate to changing notions of sexuality
statically. Either way, the repressive hypothesis requires the assumption of a transhistorical
sexuality (whether it be one cluster of notions or a variable in a constant structure) to serve as a
metahistorical reference for historical analysis. On any variation of the repressive hypothesis,
there is assumed to be a thing repressed that is distinct from the thing as it is seen in history—
which always appears qualified by some particular repressive act (or lack thereof). In keeping
with his genealogical method, Foucault aims to dissolve sexuality’s supposedly transhistorical
status. And, as he does so, he will also argue that the power that has an effect on our sexuality is
best understood as having a positive, constitutive effect—that is to say, an effect of producing
and deploying our sexuality, rather than one of confining and repressing it.18

17

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, an Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage, 1990), 3-13.
18

We have seen in NGH that the genealogist “takes history seriously” as a succession of events and
abstains from using metahistorical ordering principles. Moreover, we have seen that the genealogist, in offering an
account of the historical beginnings of cultural practices, also dissolves the metahistoricicty of certain norms by
showing how these norms were formed over time in the past. Implicit in this attempt to trace out the historical
formations of the norms of the present—the norms that are falsely taken by some historians to be metahistorical—is
a commitment to understanding the effects that cultural practices bear on these norms as positive and constitutive.
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A Genealogy of Sexuality
Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality and the repressive hypothesis begins with a simple
historical observation: rather than merely constraining language regarding sexuality and sexual
etiquette, the Victorian era triggers a proliferation of discourses regarding sexuality. Foucault
shows that what is established within these discourses is a concerted effort to discover the truth
of sex. This effort culminated in what Foucault calls “confessional science.” Foucault does not
characterize this science as a discrete discipline—its name picks out the introduction of
previously private and religious notions of sexuality into various scientific discourses—but the
characteristics of confessional science are especially prevalent in psychiatry. Discourses that
constitute the confessional science are a merger of, on the one hand, the ritualistic encounter
between the one who confesses the intimate details of his life and the authority that comes to
know and, on the other hand, scientific principles (especially those of cause and effect and
sickness and health) and scientific practices (especially, examination and interpretation). The
result of the various practices that constitute the confessional science is that sexuality is brought
to the surface of discourse, questioned in its essence, and articulated in terms of facts rather than
banished to silence, as the repressive hypothesis would have it. This confessional investigation of
sexuality results in the production of objective knowledge about sexuality. Confessional science
takes there to be an essential human truth the access to which lies within sexuality, and this truth
is pursued through an investigation that, in fact, creates this truth in the form of knowledge
claims.19
Thus, in modernity’s early discourses on sexuality, there is an altogether different
operation of power than the repressive hypothesis claims. The repressive hypothesis, in its
various forms, regards sexuality as an originary entity which can be said to have been repressed
19
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at certain points in time by certain cultural practices. But Foucault argues in his genealogy that
sexuality was not a pre-existent entity available for repression. By analyzing discourses that
preceded the form of repression alleged to have taken place in the Victorian era, Foucault shows
the construction of a sexuality purported by others to be timeless. Foucault argues that the
sexuality taken by the repressive hypothesis to be originary is a historical, political, and scientific
construction, endowed with significance that goes beyond the mere contingency of current
politics and scientific projects, and deployed as a means for understanding and relating to
ourselves and others. The hysterical woman, the masturbating child, and the perverse adult are
not found and restrained in the modern era. They are constituted in a scientific-confessional
discourse that acts to deploy sexuality on individuals. As Foucault summarizes:
In actual fact, what was involved…was the very production of sexuality.
Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to
hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to
uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct….20
Foucault’s historical dissolution of sexuality undermines the repressive hypothesis. Without a
fixed point of reference—transhistorical sexuality—it is unclear that cultural power can be said
to be repressing anything.
Foucault’s discussion of the deployment of sexuality takes up a major theme of his work
in the seventies: “disciplinary power.” Foucault argues that overlapping with the shift from the
monarchic state to the bourgeois state in Western Europe is a shift from sovereign power to
disciplinary power. Two main differences set these forms of power apart. First, disciplinary
power derives from the overall arrangement of political and extra-political institutions and
practices instead of being centralized in any one person or office. Second, disciplinary power
acts primarily through the simultaneous operation of instruction and surveillance instead of
20
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solely by restricting behavior; this new form of power physically and positively molds the
behavior of its subjects.21 This same disciplinary model of power is present in Foucault’s
articulation of the deployment of sexuality; the cluster of practices that constitute confessional
science collectively acts on subjects so as to produce certain sexualities attached to certain
valences in the modern subject instead of by merely restricting sexual behavior.
While writing HS, Foucault begins to conceive of disciplinary power in a slightly more
refined way, which he calls biopower. Biopower names a sort of controlling and shaping of
individual bodies (their behavior and arrangement) and populations (their reproduction,
sustenance, and work) that brings about special societal effects, and it is the form of power that
Foucault argues characterizes various practices and institutions within our present culture. The
operations of biopower take many forms on Foucault’s analyses, e.g. the ways contemporary
employers seek to organize individual bodies and so attain efficient arrangement of their entire
workforce; the cubicle with its separation of the worker from others that might diminish her
productivity is an example of this. In the last chapter of HS, Foucault argues that the deployment
of sexuality is one “concrete arrangement” through which biopower was enacted and secured.
Thus, “sexuality”—far from some metaphysical essence needing liberation—was deployed as an
element (a tactic) of the disciplinary power-arrangement that constitutes the modern normalizing
society.22 And thus, the repressive hypothesis and its attendant practices are, in principle,
incapable of liberating us from what may be considered the more pressing threat on freedom:
normalizing, disciplinary power. Freeing our sexuality from the “repressive power” that
threatens it—and thereby making possible a more thorough deployment of our sexuality—fails to
free us from the normalizing power that has constituted our sexuality and presented it to us as a
21
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point of access to a timeless feature of ourselves. In fact, wanting to free our sexuality assists the
deployment of sexuality insofar as it reinforces the belief in the timelessness and value of
sexuality. That is, the repressive hypothesis forms a part of the operations of biopower rather
than an opposition to it.
It may seem that in arguing for the historical constitution of sexuality, Foucault has
missed an obvious response: it is our ability to engage in sex that needs liberation from particular
deployed sexualities. One may concede that sexuality (or sexualities) is something shaped by our
culture’s history and deployed on us by current social institutions and mores but still suggest that
our ability to engage in physical acts of sex is something repressed by our culture. Thus, by
deflating “sexuality” into sexual encounters—i.e. the activity of sex—one may try to preserve a
stronger version of the repressive hypothesis.
In response, Foucault turns his genealogical gaze toward sex and argues that sex is “a
complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexuality.” Sex is a “fictitious unity” of
“bodies, organs, somatic localizations, functions, anatomo-physiological systems, sensations, and
pleasures.” The historical construction of this vague and abstract unity makes possible the
positive knowledge of sex by forming a discrete and transhistorical activity as a reference for
investigation. But far from being a secure and timeless grounding point for political resistance,
“sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality
organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations,
and pleasures.” 23
One may try to dig one’s heels in further in defense of the repressive hypothesis by
appealing to necessary and sufficient conditions of what counts as “sex.” By suggesting that
coital penetration—which necessarily has had a role in all enduring human societies heretofore—
23
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is the object of repression, we may resist Foucault’s genealogical dissolution of the repressive
hypothesis. But, responding to Foucault by offering some minimal definition of sex, such as
coital penetration, would seem to sacrifice much of the aims of those who express the need for
sexual liberation from repressive power. Part of the impetus for the repressive hypothesis, at least
in its more recent formulations, has been to resist the forces of heterosexual normalization, and
the above limitation would fail to provide a rallying point for such resistance.
A Critique of the Deployment of Sexuality
Foucault argues that the repressive hypothesis is, ultimately, contributing to the very
effects of power it claims to be opposing—although, it does so by first misunderstanding the
operations of this power. The hypothesis presumes historically contingent norms of sexuality and
sex to be metahistorical, and it thereby obstructs “liberation” from the real power at play, the
power that deploys these norms on us. Thus, Foucault objects to the strategy of opposing
power’s effect on our sexuality by means of reclaiming our “repressed” sexuality or our “lost”
sex. And at the end of his account, Foucault offers a suggestion that seems difficult to orient in
his genealogical problematic: that “[t]he rallying point for the counterattack against the
deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.” 24
With this imperative, Foucault explicitly suggests that bodies and pleasures can serve as a
basis for attacking the operation of biopower of which he has described the repressive hypothesis
to be a part. And, in the final pages of the book, Foucault begins to levy precisely such an attack
against biopower.25 Thus, it seems that Foucault is both attempting to dissolve the
“transcendental narcissism” of the repressive hypothesis by correcting its history and implicating
the repressive hypothesis in an operation to which Foucault seems to be objecting—finishing his
24
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account with an imperative. However, it is not immediately clear to what values Foucault appeals
when he criticizes the repressive hypothesis and the deployment of sexuality. Foucault has
genealogically dissolved the basis for the repressive hypothesis—sexuality and its value for us—
and has offered a redescription of the power that acts on our bodies. But in order for Foucault to
criticize biopower—or, at least, the deployment of sexuality—it would seem incumbent upon
him to offer some new normative basis for his criticism. Criticism requires an appeal to some
value that the thing being criticized is seen to transgress. And so, without finding some value that
biopower transgresses, Foucault seems to have no basis for objecting to it. But Foucault cannot,
it would seem, appeal to any such value without admitting that it too is merely historically
contingent.
At the end of the book Foucault seems to suggest that bodies and pleasures are what
underlie the historical constructs of power (i.e. sex and desire), and that they can serve as a
rallying point—or normative-political basis—for resisting normalizing biopower. In other words,
he seems to say that we can object to normalizing power because it deploys its complex
arrangement of our bodies and our pleasures on us. If Foucault understands disciplinary power to
constrain our bodies and our pleasures and holds that the freedom of expression of bodies and
pleasures is valuable, then Foucault may be able to ground his criticism of the deployment of
sexuality. But if Foucault means for bodies and pleasures to serve as a new normative basis for
his objections to biopower, then he would seem to be open to a historicist dissolution of “bodies
and pleasures” and their associated values as historically contingent, in a way similar to sexuality
and sex. Foucault offers us no reason to think that such a dissolution would be difficult to
construct, and he would seem committed to the idea that dissolutions of such a kind are always in
principle available. And so, it seems that Foucault’s offering bodies and pleasures as an
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alternative normative basis for political resistance merely replaces the problematic norms of sex
and sexuality that Foucault’s genealogy dissolves and faces the same difficulties. In order for
Foucault’s objection to the deployment of sexuality to be compelling, we must understand and
articulate his basis for such an objection and explain why it is not threatened by his own
genealogical historicism. We are now prepared to consider various attempts to understand
Foucauldian critique in the secondary literature.
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CHAPTER 3
MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF FOUCAULDIAN GENEALOGY
It is difficult to understand, much less articulate, the basis for criticism within
Foucauldian genealogy. As we have seen, fundamental to his genealogical methodology is a
rejection of transhistorical values through a historicization of the values of the present. We have
also seen that, in HS, Foucault is critical of certain present practices. But if Foucault is
committed to the historical contingency of all present-day values, then it is unclear to what
values he can appeal to ground his criticisms of present-day practices. And to compound matters,
he seems to introduce bodies and pleasures as an explicit basis for political resistance in HS.
Much of the secondary literature on Foucault has been concerned with understanding how
genealogy is supposed to be critical and what status the norm(s) of bodies and pleasures has in
Foucauldian discourse. Various interpretations have been offered to clarify the basis for
Foucauldian criticisms, but I will show that all of these fail in crucial respects to capture what is
going on in the works of Foucault.
It is helpful to introduce a basic distinction between possible ways of understanding
criticism. There is a crucial difference between transcendental critique, on the one hand, and
genealogical critique, on the other. Transcendental critique appeals to some universal ground for
reasons to offer against some position. The motivation for searching out such a universal ground
is to get beyond—or transcend—the specific positions of that which criticizes and that which is
criticized. By finding a universal ground that justifies the position of the one criticizing—a
ground that transcends these two contingent positions—transcendental critique can overcome the
contingency of its position in the debate and offer universally valid reasons against whatever it is
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that it is criticizing.26 Genealogical critique, by contrast, is a way of problematizing values that
are currently thought of as benign by offering a historical account that makes us suspicious of
them. By historicizing the norms that inform these practices, the critical genealogist is able to
shed light on a danger where it was previously indiscernible. Genealogical critique does not aim
at giving absolute reason to reject a position outright. Rather it makes a problem of the norms
implicit in the position criticized by suggesting that they are historically contingent and that their
apparent timelessness hides dangerous operations.27
Some commentators understand Foucault to be offering a transcendental critique. Others
understand him to be giving a genealogical critique. The former have argued that Foucault is
unable to offer a transcendental critique consistently, whereas the latter have given various
articulations of what a genealogical critique is exactly. In order to assess the best model for
understanding Foucauldian critique, we will have to consider both of these models in more
detail. I will begin by considering the former—transcendental critique. I will show that
understanding Foucault as offering any sort of transcendental critique is fundamentally mistaken.
Then I will turn to genealogical critique and show that its current articulations fail to be fully
26
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persuasive. After considering the various interpretations of Foucauldian critique, I will, in
chapter four, develop a new model of genealogical critique that resolves the difficulties latent in
prior attempts.
Transcendental Critique
Those who understand Foucault to offer a transcendental critique have argued that
offering a critique without the use of any sort of indissoluble normative foundation is in principle
incoherent. And so Foucault is either implicitly giving such a transcendental critique—which
would seem to contradict his historicism—or else he is utterly unable to object to the practices he
means to—in which case he would seem to contradict his critical intentions. Either
understanding of Foucault implicates him in contradiction.
Consider Foucault’s account in HS. Foucault is intent on objecting to the repressive
hypothesis and the normalizing power that deploys sexuality, of which the repressive hypothesis
is part. Foucault dissolves the transhistorical status of the norms that ground the disciplinary
power he aims to resist, and, qua genealogist, he would seem to do so without offering a
comparable transhistorical basis for his own critical position.
But if Foucault wants to argue that the deployment of sexuality is somehow bad, he must
offer his readers some value that this deployment violates. Moreover, merely appealing to some
arbitrary counter-norm would be insufficient. In order for Foucault to convince us that this
deployment is dangerous he needs some secure basis for his counter-norm—some universal basis
for his critique. So even if “the new economy of bodies and pleasures” is thought to smuggle in
the counter-norms necessary for his critique, this remains insufficient for grounding a persuasive
transcendental critique against the deployment. Foucault, it would seem, owes us some
explanation of why the norms that he appeals to (e.g. the value of unencumbered bodies and
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pleasures) have priority over the norms that ground the opposing position (e.g. the value of free
sex). Thus on this reading, Foucault’s refusal to offer explicit values derives from his refusal to
offer a basis for his critique that transcends his contingent position and that of the repressive
hypothesis.28
The above reasoning has led many to look for implicit value claims—or
“cryptonormativism” to use Habermas’ phrase—in Foucault’s histories and to show that
Foucault is unable to ground these values in his genealogical accounts. Rudi Visker specifically
argues that, in HS, Foucault treats biopower as repressing bodies and pleasures in much the same
way his antagonists have argued it represses sex and desire. And if Foucault is criticizing the
deployment of sexuality for its repression of bodies and pleasures, he is replacing one
transcendental norm (sex and desire) with another (bodies and pleasures), staying within a
variation of the repressive hypothesis, and thereby directly contradicting his genealogical
historicism.29 In short, Foucault’s historicism cuts off his ability to provide a transcendental
ground (which would necessarily transcend history) for his critique, and this inability, in turn,
threatens to render his critiques arbitrary. Merely articulating the value assumptions Foucault
makes is insufficient for solving the problem, for it would either show us the concrete ways in
which he contradicts his historicism (by assuming transhistorical values) or it would fail to
answer the further question, “Why these values?”
We have already seen that Foucault explicitly argues against a transcendentalizing
reading of history (NGH), and that he further rejects all attempts at transcendental critique (WE).
At one point he even described his historical writings as primarily aiming to “cleanse
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[historiography] of all transcendental narcissism.” 30 With all of Foucault’s explicit disavowals of
transcendental critique, we have some reason for expecting Foucault to have an answer to the
relatively simple objections just summarized. And, indeed, a Foucauldian response to this
criticism need not, at first, be terribly complicated. Foucault’s histories do more than
problematize his search for transhistorical grounds for critique. Foucault’s histories serve as
arguments against any transhistorical normative ground—or, more precisely, arguments against
each particular transhistorical basis with which his genealogies are explicitly concerned, e.g. the
normativity of liberated sexuality. It is in this sense that Foucault’s histories are importantly
anti-transcendental. The result of this is that those who criticize Foucault for his
crytonormativism are importantly begging the question against him by supposing, falsely, that all
critique must be transcendental. Foucault has, in fact, given us reason to think that no
transcendental critique is possible. And so, naturally, there is no reason at all for thinking that a
transcendental model will support any mode of critique he offers—since, on his view, it would
fail to support any critique.
But this only responds to part of the critical philosopher’s concern. Habermas and others
are certainly right to say that Foucault owes us some account of where his counter-norms are
coming from if his critique is to avoid being arbitrary. What is question-begging about the
transcendentalist reading of Foucault is the insistence that he offer a universal basis for his
counter-norms. But Foucault does indeed owe us some alternate account of the basis for his
counter-normativity—of his normative ground. Foucault has shown us the impossibility of
transcendental critique. But, I will argue in this chapter and chapter four that he does offer an
coherent, alternate mode of critique. For now it suffices to isolate the critical question that
30
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transcendentalists leave the Foucauldian to address: Given that Foucault cannot, and claims he
does not, appeal to bodies and pleasures as a timeless, universal, transcendental value, what
alternate ground does he offer?
The Historical A Priori as an Alternative Transcendentalism
A related reading of Foucault is that instead of offering a properly transcendental critique,
which aims to ground its objections in a universal a priori, Foucault is offering a historicotranscendental critique grounded in a historical a priori.31 This reading agrees with the
transcendental reading that Foucault is offering some implicit value that biopower is seen to
transgress with the deployment of sexuality. But this reading differs from a straightforward
transcendental critique insofar as the value that underlies Foucault’s critique is not purported to
be metahistorical. This value is still thought to transcend the debate in which it is deployed, but
this transcendence remains bound to a broader historical context. On this reading, something like
the free arrangement of bodies and pleasures would serve for Foucault as a norm grounding his
criticism of the deployment of sexuality. The basis for this value, however, is our particular
historical epoch in which the value is established as currently unquestionable. It is this epoch
which grounds the value’s relative priority over other values (e.g. sexual freedom), rather than a
universal a priori. Unlike a properly transcendental critique, Foucault’s objection understood as
a historico-transcendental critique would not need to postulate metahistorical norms and so
would not obviously contradict his genealogical historicity.
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However, there are at least two good reasons for thinking that Foucault is not grounding
his objections in a historical a priori. First, his historical account does nothing to establish the
historical significance of the value of bodies and pleasures. That is, we do not find anywhere in
HS an argument that this value is unquestionable within our historical epoch; he never explicitly
grounds bodies and pleasures in a historical a priori. If anything, Foucault’s history can be seen
to ground sex and desire in the current historical a priori. He carefully traces out the importance
sexuality has come to have in modern discourse as an allegedly timeless normative cluster and
the location of the essence of our persons. The very fact that sexuality required an elaborate
genealogy to be revealed as historically contingent is a reason to suppose that it serves as a part
of our historical a priori. As a part of our historical a priori, sex and desire, not bodies and
pleasures, can serve as a legitimate ground that lies beyond question for contemporary discourse,
i.e. as a ground for a historico-transcendental critique. If Foucault’s history can be seen as an
argument for including sex and desire within our historical a priori, then Foucault must
somehow ground bodies and pleasures as a, somehow, more fundamental historical a priori. But
Foucault in no way attempts to do so.
Second and to repeat a point I made above, Foucault’s genealogies are not only nontranscendental but also anti-transcendental; Foucault’s genealogy not only abstains from the
postulation of metahistorical norms, it also sets out to oppose all transcendentalizing histories. In
NGH, for example, Foucault writes that genealogy sets out to reveal “the accidents, the minute
deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty
calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to exist and have value for us.” 32 That
is to say, Foucault is interested in challenging both the timelessness of cultural norms and
practices as well as the norms and practices themselves. (Consider his lines in WE, where
32
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Foucault describes his critical ethos as an experimental test of the limits of who we are.33)
Although historico-transcendental critique avoids appealing to timeless values, it still constrains
the possible scope of critique to that which is currently not unquestionable within our culture.
And this constraint on Foucault’s ability to critique would utterly fail to account for Foucauldian
genealogies that have brought certain practices to question for the first time.
This tension is easily seen in HS. In Foucault’s historical analysis, he is clearly intent on
dissolving the transcendental status of the normative cluster tied up with sexuality. His emphasis
on the historical beginning of sexuality in discourse is intended to illuminate the temporary
nature of the values tied up with sexuality and to challenge accounts that see these values as
being beyond question. In order to demarcate a historical a priori, one attempts to identify the
norms that are currently beyond question for us, with a caveat that unquestionableness is
confined to a historical context. But Foucault’s account is organized so as to lure us to look
beyond the unquestionable values of our era, and not to accept them as a basis for critique. In
short, if Foucault’s historical discussion has any relation to historical a priori it appears to be a
destructive relation. And so, Foucault would also appear to be offering an anti-historicotranscendental critique.
Anti-Transcendental Critique
The anti-transcendental intentions of Foucauldian genealogy bring us to Raymond Geuss’
“genealogical critique” as a possible alternative to the varieties of transcendental critique
considered so far. On Geuss’ view, Foucault does not set out to give universal—or
transhistorically valid—reasons for thinking that certain practices are bad. Rather, Foucault tries
33
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to show why certain practices are dangerous. Danger, in this sense, is a contrary to benign or
unquestionable. On Geuss’ account, Foucault intends to persuade his audience that the practices
they have taken to be of universal value are only of contingent value. And since they are only
contingently valued, it is possible that they could come to be disvalued. If the positive or neutral
value of certain practices depends on the perceived timelessness of the norms that inform these
practices, then a historical dissolution of these norms threatens the status of the practices as good
or benign. And, according to Geuss, Foucault intends, first, to demonstrate the reliance of certain
practices on this transhistorical universality and, second, to dissolve genealogically that
transhistorical status.
On Geuss’ interpretation, Foucault is interested in putting the acceptability of certain
practices into question, but not in answering the question for or against these practices once and
for all. The important assumption, on this reading, is that certain cultural practices can appear
benign only when they are based on certain transhistorical norms and values. For example,
discourses that seek to determine the truth of sex and sexuality are taken to be benign only when
sexuality itself is taken as a metahistorical object of which true things can be predicated.
According to Geuss, by showing these practices to rely on historically contingent norms, the
practices’ unquestionable nature evaporates. And the possibility of practices being normatively
questionable when they appear utterly benign is supposed to motivate us to be suspicious of the
danger of these practices. Thus on this reading, Foucault’s project is limited to the demonstrably
historical nature of would-be transhistorical norms.34
On this interpretation, the incommensurability between Foucault’s account of the
deployment of sexuality and that of the repressive hypothesis is supposed to serve as a reason to
be suspicious of the rhetoric of the repressive hypothesis and the operations of confessional
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science. The place of sexuality in contemporary discourse is supposed to make us suspicious, in
part, because it presents itself to us as timeless (we have always been sexual) and, in part,
because it purports to get at the very essence of our being (we are sexual beings or sex lies on the
axis of our essence). This practice may remain neutral without conflicting with Foucault’s
account, on Geuss’ view. But Foucault’s account is successful insofar as it illuminates a danger
(or possible harm) previously unrecognized—the danger of what the deployment of sexuality
might really be up to behind the mask of metahistorical norms.
Geuss’ interpretation of Foucault seems promising, for it distances Foucault from
transcendentalizing moves. It does so by understanding Foucault’s entire problematic in terms of
his historicism and how these implications might change the way we view contemporary
practices so much that their normative status is put in question. And it also does so without
robust value assumptions. I take this approach to be insightful for understanding much of what is
going on in the criticisms within Foucault’s works. However, there remains an as yet
unaddressed normative question. Geuss suggests that the critical force of Foucault’s accounts
derives from their ability to make its readers suspicious of certain practices which had previously
been thought of as being benign. But what, exactly, is supposed to make us suspicious of these
practices once they have been revealed to operate on the basis of historically contingent norms?
Something is rendered suspicious when that thing, formally thought of as being innocent, is
revealed to be dangerous. We might describe becoming suspicious as suspending the tacit
approval of something. The question that Geuss’ account faces is what exactly motivates this
suspense of approval in Foucault’s audience (which is the same as asking what motivates the
perception of danger).
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If I (even only tacitly) approve of some practice—for example, the psychiatric
investigation of sexuality—this is because I am (at least tacitly) committed to the possible or
actual benefit of this practice. Thus, if I am to suspend this approval, it would need to be
motivated by some other commitment with which this practice conflicts—e.g. some notion of
harm which this practice may possibly or actually bring about. Although the suspense may not be
final—I am suspicious, not necessarily condemning—I still must have some reason for
suspending my approval of these psychiatric discourses. Finally, whatever commitment it is with
which Foucault’s analysis enables us to see psychiatric discourse on sex to come into conflict,
Foucault still must address the question of the basis for endorsing this commitment over and
against the psychiatric discourse one had previously endorsed.
What Geuss appears to isolate as the problematic or dangerous element of the practices
that form a part of the deployment of sexuality is their appearing one way upon the assumption
of the transhistorical status of sexuality—as searching for the truth and freedom of sexuality—
and appearing another in the eyes of the genealogist—producing and deploying sexuality as a
meaning- and value-laden way of controlling the behavior of peoples. That is to say, this
objection to the repressive hypothesis and confessional science assumes that the illusory status of
their apparent function is a reason to regard the practices as (possibly) bad—dangerous. But this
assumption may easily be denied, and Foucault, on this view, has no means of defending it. After
all, philosophers have for some time suggested that social practices are not necessarily
accompanied by the most incisive understanding of what it is they are doing. Foucault may be
offering an original and even radical interpretation of what certain cultural practices are up to,
but whether this interpretation compels one to a radical suspicion, or any suspicion at all, is
another issue altogether. A mere difference between the apparent way things operate and the way
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they are revealed to operate upon careful analysis is insufficient for deciding that the practice is
dangerous unless we have some independent reason to object to the revealed operations. Take,
for example, the apparent fluid motion created by the projection of moving film. To the naïve
mind of a child, the projected images are apparently displaying the motion of visible figures
(subject) in a given space (frame), or the motion of that given space (frame) within a broader
implied space (by panning). But, upon inspection, what the video-display equipment is actually
transmitting is a quick succession of still images which together appear as uninterrupted
movement. Surely, when the child learns about the operation of film, she has gained no reason to
be suspicious of it. What need a better articulation are the values that are at stake in the various
understandings of these practices and the ground for these values.
Internal Critique
We might offer a related but distinct account of Foucauldian critique by cashing out
danger a little bit differently; it might be thought that Foucault’s criticism could be understood as
internal critique. On this view, Foucault would be understood to be undermining certain cultural
practices by showing how they conflict with the very value-commitments they espouse. The
sense of danger that genealogical critique is attempting to establish, on this view, would be that
of an internal conflict within the cultural practices it examines. This reading seems to be
advantageous over reading danger as mere illusoriness, because if something fails on its own
standards we need not worry about giving an independent ground for critique—i.e. the
genealogist need not explain why illusoriness per se is dangerous. It is worth noting that this
model of critique is not employed to explain Foucault’s critiques anywhere in the secondary
literature. Although it is related to Geuss’ account, it is importantly distinct. And this model does
have something to offer our understanding of Foucault, but only in a highly qualified sense that I
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will come back to in chapter four. On its own, however, it fails to account adequately for
genealogical critique for three significant reasons.
We can articulate a reading of HS as internal critique in the following way: Political
activism that is inspired by the repressive hypothesis is committed to resisting the power that
controls sexuality. If such activism is seen to actually contribute to this power, then it is
internally inconsistent. Upon Foucault’s analysis, this activism does, in fact, assist normalizing
power through the deployment of sexuality. Thus, it is internally inconsistent.
The first problem with the model of internal critique as an explanation of genealogical
critique is that it overlooks an important component of Foucault’s analysis, which amounts to
employing an equivocation. Continuing to use HS as an example, Foucault at no point argues
that political action for sexual liberation actually contributes to sexual repression. The very target
of this activism is called into question by Foucault. Sexual repression is a fictitious operation of
power on Foucault’s account; the institutions that are the target of this activism are not, in the
final analysis, repressing anything. Rather, they are caught up in a larger cultural context that
produces and deploys sexuality. That which Foucault shows the political activism of sexual
liberation to assist (the effective deployment of sexuality) is not the same thing as that which it is
committed to opposing (sexual repression). Thus, such political action is not shown on
Foucault’s analysis to be implicated in a contradiction.
But internal critique also fails to account for genealogical critique in a second and more
profound way. The instance of internal critique offered above criticizes the repressive
hypothesis. But Foucault is explicitly interested in inciting resistance to the deployment of
sexuality, and not merely to movements, based on the repressive hypothesis, which fail to
recognize the deployment. An internal critique of the repressive hypothesis does not amount to a
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critique of the deployment of sexuality at all. The model of internal critique only enables the
genealogist to problematize cultural practices from within. But Foucault is not suggesting that
the deployment of sexuality is internally incoherent. Rather, he is attempting to persuade his
audience to oppose this deployment from a particular normative context: a new economy of
bodies and pleasures.
This brings me to the third difficulty with the internal model of critique. Setting aside the
equivocation between repressive and normalizing power, one might respond to the last objection
by understanding Foucault to show a tension between one practice (sexual-liberation activism)
and another (any of those practices that constitute the deployment of sexuality). This would
broaden the scope of the internal critique to some larger context than merely, e.g., the repressive
hypothesis. But this broader internal critique still does not explain why Foucault’s readers would
—much less ought to—suspend their approval of one of the practices (the deployment) in favor
of the other (political action). Foucault wants to motivate us to be suspicious of the deployment
of sexuality in particular. And so, he still needs to provide some ground for his critique. This
ground needs to explain why, when faced with a tension between practices to which I am tacitly
committed, I will be persuaded to find the one dangerous and not the other. This brings us back
to the same concern that the critical theorists have raised to Foucault (see the section
“Transcendental Critique” above), and none of the models of critique considered thus far have
established a basis for addressing it. How can Foucault’s histories motivate his audience to take a
particular side in the conflicts he describes?
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CHAPTER 4
GENEALOGICALLY AS SITUATED CRITIQUE
Genealogy and Critique
Our survey of the various attempts at accounting for the ground of Foucault’s objections
to cultural practices has revealed several ways in which Foucault cannot ground his critiques. He
is not attempting to give a transcendental critique because he is clearly not seeking a universal or
timeless basis for his critique. Neither is he attempting to offer a historico-transcendental critique
because his histories do not appear to locate anything that could be considered a historical a
priori. I have argued that Foucault’s genealogies are better understood as explicitly antitranscendental, which is to say that it seems to be an important element of his criticisms that he
closes off the possibility of all transcendental critiques.
Alternatively, we have seen that understanding Foucault’s criticisms as antitranscendental does not on its own constitute an explanation of the ground of his critique. Merely
showing practices to be the product of biopower does not, on its own, constitute a critique of
these practices. Although Foucault may not be arguing for why, e.g., the deployment of sexuality
is bad, wrong, or to be rejected outright, he is trying to show the potential and heretofore
unrecognized danger this deployment poses. And motivating a suspicion of the danger regarding
these practices still requires some value-commitment with which the practice in question is seen
to (at least potentially) come into conflict.
But our survey of the various understandings of Foucault’s criticisms of cultural practices
has clarified the important and paradoxical question it is now my task to answer directly:
Whence the ground for criticizing cultural practices as dangerous in Foucault’s historical
accounts? In response to this question, I argue that Foucault is offering a historical dissolution of
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practices and the norms they rely on, which, in turn, enables a confrontation between the these
practices and other value-commitments within our present context. Thus, what is afforded by
Foucauldian genealogy is a confrontation between certain practices of our present culture and
other present-day values already held by Foucault’s audience to which Foucault is always
implicitly appealing. That is to say, the normative ground for Foucauldian critique is the
collection of contingent commitments of his audience which he precisely does not attempt to
establish as timeless, universal, and transcendental.
With Geuss, I understand Foucault’s anti-transcendentalism to be an effort to make
possible the recognition of danger where it was previously closed off by transhistorical values.
But with Habermas, I agree that in order for Foucault’s genealogy to motivate the suspicion of
certain cultural practices, Foucault must, explicitly or implicitly, appeal to some ground of
normative commitments. However, this ground need not be cryptonormative in such a way that
threatens to implicate Foucault in contradiction; they are not values that he attempts to ground as
in any way universal. Rather they are already present (and therefore accessible for the critical
genealogist) as the contingent commitments of Foucault’s audience.
In this chapter, I will elaborate on this model of genealogical critique, explain why it best
accounts for the genealogies Foucault gives, and consider some of the implications of this mode
of critique.
The Destructive Work of History
In order to clearly articulate my explanation of critique in Foucauldian genealogy, it is
helpful to clarify a distinction that has already been offered. Recall Geuss’ distinction between
transcendental and genealogical critique. This distinction consisted, in part, in the difference
between searching for universal normative grounds for objecting, in the former case, and merely
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putting certain practices into question by making a problem out of them, in the latter. I want to
sharpen this distinction by suggesting that whereas a transcendental critique seeks to put certain
norms beyond question by granting them a timeless status, genealogical objection seeks to
remove precisely such a metahistorical status and thereby open these very norms back up to
question. The transcendental critique seeks to close off questions regarding the value of certain
norms, and Foucault is seeking to open these questions back up.
But, as we have already seen, merely opening these questions back up does not, on its
own, show how the practices that depend on these norms are dangerous. Any suspicion of these
now-historically-exposed norms must be grounded in some value-commitment with which they
are seen to come into conflict. And this is why I, here, depart from Geuss by adding that
Foucault’s genealogical critique must have recourse to certain values.
Now, if the values in question are sought in timeless (or even relatively timeless) origins,
then we have not ultimately gotten away from the effort to establish, hopeless on Foucault’s
view, a transcendental ground for critique. Foucault argues explicitly in NGH that careful
examinations of history reveal the historical status of all would-be metahistorical norms. So,
Foucault explicitly closes off the option of replacing one timeless norm (sex and desire) with
another (bodies and pleasures). Rather, to be consistent with his Nietzschean historicism, he must
always recognize the historical contingency of present-day values and practices.
From the perspective of the genealogist, though, the world need not be valueless. On the
one hand, Foucault dissolves the timelessness of our values and the practices and discourses built
upon them. But, on the other hand, by acknowledging that this dissolution is not on its own an
objection to these values, the Foucauldian can resist a lapse into a nihilistic pessimism. The
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genealogist remains, to some degree at least, rooted in the admittedly historically contingent
value-commitments of the present (a fact evinced in Foucault’s non-academic life35).
Foucault’s genealogies are indeed intended to lead his readers to be suspicious of
practices within their own culture. But this suspicion is neither a valueless paranoia nor a mere
reaction to the discontinuity between the way a practice presents itself (as grounded in timeless
values) and how it is seen to operate upon genealogical analysis (distributing normalized
behavior). Foucault does aim to render certain practices suspicious, but he does so by putting the
practices into question—which is accomplished by stripping away their ability to appeal to
unquestionable and objective values—and then bringing them into conflict with other
commitments that his readers already possess. Thus, the Foucauldian genealogy does not offer
any sort of new ground for criticism. Rather, genealogy makes possible criticisms that were
formerly impossible, not because they lacked a basis, but because they lacked a transhistorical
basis that was thought to be necessary to oppose practices that, themselves, claimed to be rooted
in such transhistoricity. Once the allegedly transhistorical norms that ground various practices in
our culture have been shown, by genealogy, to be historically contingent, other competing
historically contingent norms are brought to an equal footing with the formerly unassailable
practices that Foucault puts in question by means of genealogical investigation.
One final and crucial move is necessary. So far, I have described how it is possible that
historically contingent practices can be brought into conflict with the value-commitments of
Foucault’s audience. But in order for this to provide a solution to the problem I have repeatedly
emphasized, we need some ground for settling this conflict in favor of the commitments of his
audience and not in favor of the current operations of power. Without this ground, Foucault’s
35
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critique would appear to oppose the way things are in our culture arbitrarily. Foucault takes the
value-commitments of his audience to be the very ground for his critique. His analyses reveal the
conflict between his audience-ground and the various historico-cultural practices that he
investigates. But since one side of this conflict is also the group of persons Foucault is
attempting to persuade to be suspicious of these practices, there is no difficulty in his taking his
audience as the de facto ground for critique. Foucault is attempting to persuade a particular group
of persons with a particular set of commitments to be suspicious of something specific. He is not
attempting to persuade all persons everywhere (or some universalized abstract group of persons).
And the contingent set of commitments that this particular group of people happen to have will
certainly be relevant to precisely this particular group. Thus, Foucault need not offer any more
elaborate justification for treating these commitments as the ground for his critique than that
which I have just offered.
The Bodies and Pleasures of Foucault’s Audience
To see both why Foucault’s ability to problematize current practices requires only an
appeal to the values of his audience as the ground of critique and how this amounts to a novel
project, it will be helpful to enumerate the key claims of HS: (1) Sexuality is historically
contingent. More precisely, the bundle of norms that constitutes sexuality (or particular
sexualities) is the historically contingent product of networks of recent but ongoing historical
practices. Put another way, Foucault attempts to show that sexuality is not metahistorical. (2)
Practices that apparently appeal to the preexisting notion of sexuality are, in fact, deploying
sexuality and thereby contributing to its constitution. The implementation of this bundle to
understand others, ourselves, or our culture valorizes sexuality and normalizes its usage.
Sexuality has cultural significance only so long as it is employed within the discourses and
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practices of our culture. This contingent significance follows from the claim that sexuality has no
metahistorical significance. But the contingency of the significance of sexuality entails that the
more it is employed, the more likely it is to remain significant. And so, employing sexuality as a
significant notion obstructs attempts to deplete its cultural significance. Moreover, the use of this
notion in new practical or discursive contexts broadens its application and strengthens its
perceived naturalness and even its apparent timelessness. By spreading the use of this notion, it
becomes more entrenched in our cultural self-understanding. This is what makes possible
Foucault’s remarks that the repressive hypothesis, in a certain sense, works for the very power it
thinks it is opposing; this hypothesis further entrenches the deployment of sexuality by extending
the cultural significance of the notion as a meaningful point to rally behind. (3) The deployment
of sexuality is an expression of biopower. That is to say, the deployment of sexuality is not an
isolated operation of our culture. This deployment is intimately tied up with an overall trend in
our culture to monitor, control, and homogenize the behavior of individual persons. And its role
within this trend can be demarcated and analyzed.
These three claims do not, as of yet, warrant any conclusion to the effect that there is
something bad or even dangerous about the repressive hypothesis, the deployment of sexuality,
or biopower as a whole. What they do is to put the repressive hypothesis into question as a
method of obtaining any significant liberation, and thereby they might give us reason to abandon
the repressive hypothesis as impractical. And so we might think that if Foucault intends solely to
show that this one hypothesis is ultimately uninteresting, his competing account suffices. But he
goes beyond the claim that the repressive hypothesis is naïve to the stronger claim that it is
counter-productive at achieving some end related to—but necessarily distinct from—its
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articulated goal of sexual liberation. 36 He even proposes an alternative rallying point for political
resistance—a new economy of bodies and pleasures.37 By both suggesting that this hypothesis is,
in some way, counter-productive and proposing an alternative strategy to achieving some related
political goal, Foucault appears to be in an agreement with the repressive hypothesis’ goals in
some scarcely articulated way. Indeed, this agreement is precisely what I believe others have
failed to articulate correctly. This agreement between the position of Foucault’s genealogy and
the repressive hypothesis consists in the devaluation of the current cultural structures that bear on
—for Foucault, deploy, and for the repressive hypothesis, repress—sexuality. But this brings us
right back to the question of how Foucault grounds this devaluation.
Our minimal interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical critique—the three points above—
has not yet accounted for the critical aim of undermining the deployment of sexuality and
making the repressive hypothesis appear dangerous. In order for Foucault to suggest that the
repressive hypothesis amounts to something dangerous, Foucault has to offer some variation of
the value that motivates the repressive hypothesis. The limited agreement he needs to locate can
be articulated as making apparent why biopower might be understood to be dangerous in some
way analogous to the danger formerly recognized in repressive power over sex. And, as we have
seen, there is a passage at the end of HS that seems to offer just such a basis for danger: a danger
to bodies and pleasures. Therefore, to the three claims above, I add: (4) The operations
characteristic of biopower—most significantly, the deployment of sexuality—conflict with
exploring bodies and pleasures in new ways by deploying only particular arrangements of them.
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Claim (4) captures the significance of Foucault’s suggestion that instead of rallying
behind sex and desires we ought to rally behind a new economy of bodies and pleasures if we
want to oppose biopower.38 When Foucault makes this suggestion, he is explicitly appealing to
the values of his readers. But the conditional nature of this proposition is important. Foucault is
not attempting to ground this value as universal in any way. The value of new ways of exploring
bodies and pleasures is not a new metahistorical basis for critique. Rather, it is taken up as a
more historically conscious39 articulation of a value present in his audience. By suggesting this
value as a better articulation of the practical efforts of his audience than free sexuality—while
appealing to a very similar commitment in his audience—Foucault is appealing to the very
adherents of the position to which he has been offering a corrective in HS. He is opening up
practices to criticism, which were previously thought invulnerable, and he is doing so on the
basis of values we already have. By recommending a new application of the values that inspired
the repressive hypothesis, Foucault gives his readers reason to think of biopower and its
operations as dangerous for them—threatening possible ways of exploring bodies and pleasures.
One way to capture concisely this crucial component of Foucault’s critical strategy is to
see him as taking seriously the demonstrably contingent set of values that his readers actually
have, whereas a transcendental critique requires abstraction away from one’s particular audience
and to some universal ground for critique when one argues. Foucault—who challenges the a
priori that would ground such abstract value-appeals through genealogical dissolution—
recognizes the contingency of his audience’s values. And by appealing to these values, Foucault
can be seen to be interested in the actual commitments of his audience over and against critical
theorists, such as Habermas, who abstract away from their actual audience to a universal,
38
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timeless audience that necessarily does not exist and the importance of which Foucault attempts
to show is only the contingent product of the history of thought. Ultimately, my understanding of
Foucault’s relation to his audience, as the ground to which his genealogical critiques appeal, can
easily be recognized as following from Foucault’s own anti-transcendental project and his
attempt to take philosophically seriously our historically situated condition—a condition he
attempts to capture with the image of a new economy of bodies and pleasures.
Dispensable Norms and the Internal Critique of the Present
Although the value of new ways of experiencing bodies and pleasures is, in an important
sense, what makes possible the criticism of the deployment of sexuality, it is also, in the end,
dispensable to Foucault’s genealogical criticism. Since this value is not grounded by his analysis
—i.e. from within his historical account—but rather is grounded in the contingent values that his
audience is thought to share, the value can be rejected without threatening any of the claims (1)(4), which we have attributed to Foucault. And so, the value per se is a dispensable one.
The dispensable status of these values can be easily demonstrated if one considers that
the criticism of the deployment of sexuality, which the valuation of new distributions of bodies
and pleasures makes possible, can be made possible in other ways. Claim (4) need not be
articulated in terms of the conflict between biopower and bodies and pleasures. This value is one
of many that his audience, at least ostensibly, holds. The force of Foucault’s problematization of
current practices rests on more than any one particular value. It certainly does depend on the
contingent values of the present, which is what keeps his account from nihilism. I expressed this
above by saying that Foucault’s audience—or his broader normative-cultural context—serves as
the ground for his critique. But the problematic itself requires only that his audience find some
value-commitment or set of value-commitments to be in conflict with the operations of power he

43
describes, such as the deployment of sexuality. The value of new ways of experiencing bodies
and pleasures is not only contingent historically. It also serves a contingent role in his criticism.
But the example of bodies and pleasures is important, since it is intended to capture the practical,
present-day concerns that motivated the repressive hypothesis. Thus, this particular example has
appeal to what is likely to be the largest audience of a work on the history of sexuality.
In the last chapter, I argued that Foucault’s mode of undermining current social practices
should be understood as distinct from internal critique. I argued that his opposition to these
practices depends on reference to values outside of these practices. But, it is now clear that the
values to which Foucault appeals are not outside of all articulable contexts. They lie precisely
within the practical concerns of the present. This makes possible a view of his genealogical
critique of practices of the present as a sort of internal critique of the present.
Foucault approaches the present as a collection of historically contingent discourses and
practices analyzed on the level of power structures that produce norms. The production of norms
in the past makes possible reference points for present discourses and practices. And when we
forget that these norms have been so produced, the practices of the present carry the veil of
universality and timelessness. As a result, these same practices make possible a ground for new
norms, and so on. This process encloses thought, precluding the possibility of thinking and
valuing otherwise. And so, Foucault illuminates the historical contingency of these grounding
norms for discourses and practices. Then he redescribes the operation of these discourses and
practices as being without universal and timeless grounding norms. Such a redescription makes
possible an opposition between these very practices and the values of his audience who, at the
end of the day, are also engaged in the various contingent discourses and practices of the present.
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The clash between the practical values of Foucault and his readers and the operations of
power, which are no longer protected by transhistoricity, amounts to a sort of internal critique of
the normative conditions of the present. But this broad sort of internal critique is still distinct
from the narrower sort I considered in chapter three. To problematize the overall conditions of
our present culture by drawing out internal tensions—its power-structures, its discourses of
knowledge, the values we hold, and the things we do—is not the same as criticizing a particular
component of our culture—say, a particular practice—by pointing to its internal conflicts.
Foucault attempts to persuade us to be suspicious of the deployment of sexuality based on a
commitment to new distributions of bodies and pleasures, and not the other way around. The
simple model of internal critique does not, on its own, allow for this distinction, and, so,
Foucault cannot be offering an internal critique of these practices.
However, part of what results from his critique of particular practices—a critique situated
within the normative context of his audience—is the problematization of the current
configuration of the present. This problematization makes possible thinking beyond the
conditions of our present culture; it opens up room to imagine new ways of cultural being.
Expressing Foucauldian critique as enabling a sort of internal critique of the present is an insight
heretofore unrecognized. And it expresses well the way in which Foucault’s particular
genealogical critiques aim to open up new, possible futures.
In summary, the ability of Foucault’s genealogies to be wielded against cultural practices
requires an appeal to his audiences’ values—it requires reference to certain historically
contingent values that these practices can be seen, upon historical investigation, to (at least
potentially) transgress. This context of the audience is the ground of Foucauldian critique.
However, Foucault is not committed to any particular commitments within this ground; he only
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ever needs this ground to provide some value-commitments (perhaps different for different
persons) that can be seen to conflict with the practices he analyzes. And neither does Foucault
attempt to establish this contingent ground as in any way universal. It merely provides a
particular and historically situated context in which to operate and from which to critique.
The Motivation to Genealogy
A couple of pressing issues remain to be considered. First, on the surface, my account of
Foucault’s appeal to the values of his audience may appear to be the very cryptonormativism of
which Habermas accused him. We have admitted, after all, that Foucault is appealing to the
values of his audience in HS in order to offer a critique of certain operations of biopower. But, as
my discussion of the dispensability of the values underlying Foucauldian critique makes clear,
Foucault avoids a quasi-transcendental move. These values to which he appeals are not taken to
be anything other than the contingent commitments of his audience, and even his account itself
only requires that his audience have some commitment that can be seen to conflict with the
cultural practices as he describes them. Thus, Foucault is not committed to any particular set of
value-commitments as having a timeless or universal status.
There is a second and more pressing issue that concerns Foucauldian critique. If
genealogical critique of the deployment of sexuality was made possible only by first dissolving
the seemingly unquestionable—i.e. transhistorical—status of sexuality through an appeal to other
currently unquestioned—but in principle equally questionable—present-day norms (bodies and
pleasures), then one might wonder whether the accusation of arbitrariness might stick to
Foucault. We may ask him to account for why he calls into question only the norms that he does.
We may be suspicious that his appeal to bodies and pleasures could be undermined, in turn, by

46
further genealogical critique. And in addition to asking Foucault why he offers the particular
genealogy that he does, we may ask him why he offers any at all.
The answer to these questions will be related, but it should first be anticipated that any
answer to these questions that is supposed to be convincing to everyone at any time would
supplant Foucault’s anti-transcendental endeavors in his genealogies. And so, if the question is
put in terms of what transcendental ground legitimizes a motivation to construct genealogies,
then we must answer on behalf of Foucault that no such ground is to be had. And this response
can be taken as an indictment of his account only if we assume, wrongly on his view, that such a
transcendental basis could ever be given.
I will divide my response to this concern into two parts. First, Foucauldian genealogies
should be understood as deriving from the practical concerns in the present. That is to say,
genealogy takes up its investigations from an orientation within present socio-political
conflicts.40 This claim is, doubtless, not surprising considering my interpretation of the
situatedness of Foucault’s criticism of the deployment of sexuality. Foucault is not writing in a
normative vacuum. Neither, contra Habermas, is he pretending to achieve a transhistorical
vantage from which to write history. Standing outside of history is precisely what Foucault aims
to problematize. So, his motivation for his critical project must also begin in the present.
In HS, Foucault begins writing his genealogy from a perspective interested in the stakes
of resistance to seemingly oppressive cultural norms regarding sexuality. These stakes demarcate
the questions of interest for Foucault and his audience. But the genealogist, motivated to avoid
and oppose appeal to metahistorical norms, works to undermine our cultural understanding of
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sexuality and to turn our sense of danger toward the very notion of sexuality itself rather than
attempting to clarify the essence of sexuality or the value of its freedom. This particular
genealogical critique is not arbitrary. It is motivated out of the very same practical context that
motivates the repressive hypothesis. But, on Foucault’s view, activists operating on the basis of
that hypothesis fail to appreciate the magnitude of the forces with which they struggle. Insofar as
sexuality can be seen to be a historical construct, freeing it hardly amounts to a substantive
resistance to the normalizing effects of our culture.
Second, Foucault’s genealogy only dissolves the transhistoricity of certain norms—in
this case, sex and sexuality. Similarly, he only brings his analysis to oppose certain practices—in
this case, the deployment of sexuality and the repressive hypothesis. And, indeed, his opposition
to the deployment of sexuality involves an appeal to certain other norms. Even if one concedes
that the norms and practices Foucault opposes are not arbitrarily chosen and that the norms of his
audience to which he appeals are neither seen as transhistorical nor caught up in the same
objectionable practices he puts in question, one may still suggest that another genealogy can be
constructed to oppose the norms that Foucault implicitly takes for granted. And, indeed, such a
possibility is fathomable. Moreover, it is insufficient for the Foucauldian to respond by saying
that the situated context of his genealogy is somehow valorized above some other context. To do
so would be to ascribe a transcendent status to his position, and to do that would be thoroughly
ungenealogical. A counter-genealogy to Foucault’s is certainly possible. And it could very well
serve as an objection to Foucault’s critique. But to suppose that this possibility is an objection to
Foucauldian genealogy is to misunderstand his methods.
Foucauldian genealogies are as contingent as the norms it dissolves and the practices it
problematizes. A genealogy strives neither for objectivity nor for finality. This is why Foucault
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writes in WE that the philosophical ethos he adopts when he writes genealogy is one that is “a
permanent critique of our historical era.” 41 This attitude is one Foucault takes to be characteristic
of modern Western philosophy. And it is one that persists because time always continues and
with it our culture continues to form new power-relations, which situates new practical concerns,
making possible new analyses, and motivating new critiques. To propose a properly genealogical
critique of one of Foucault’s genealogies is to share his ethos and, ostensibly, his very endeavor
of bringing the status quo of the present into question. And thus, a genealogical critique of
Foucault’s work, far from being a critique of Foucault, is quintessentially Foucauldian.
Foucault is not compelled to give an incentive for genealogy. The philosophical ethos he
describes in WE serves merely as an explanation of the attitude that the genealogist in fact has
taken up. Therefore, even though the permanence of the project that this attitude takes up sounds
suspiciously transhistorical, the admission of the contingency of this attitude (even if pervading
an entire era of thought in the West) prevents it from having any transcendental pretensions. It is
sufficient, for the genealogist, to demonstrate how cultural practices that we once thought were
benign can be seen to come into conflict with other values to which we are committed. The role
that his audience plays as ground for critique necessarily means that his genealogies do not
aspire to permanent critiques of our cultural practices. But that would be an absurd in any case,
goal given that the practices themselves are not permanent. So long as the historical analyses
continue to pick out cultural practices relevant to his historically situated audience and so long as
no persuasive counter-genealogies have been yet arisen, his works may continue to be seen as
meaningful for our self-understanding and our political activity. But as the context of the persons
who would read his works change, the importance of his accounts will diminish. This, however,
is the very point Foucault is driving at when he says that the work of the genealogist is never
41
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done. The historically contingent significance of the genealogist’s work stresses the importance
of a proliferation of genealogical activity. She must continue to proffer new genealogies of
different practices based on different contexts. It is conceivable that a genealogist would
eventually come around full circle to problematize the very values that made prior
problematizations possible. But this possibility is not a criticism of the genealogical method
since genealogy aims at no more than a situated criticism of cultural practices—not at a
universally valid critique of them.
Thus, we have come back to answering the question of the purpose of genealogy. Insofar
as Foucault would accept the challenge to give an account of the purpose of genealogy, his
response would be to say that genealogy is the endeavor to challenge the timelessness of our own
present, to bring into contrast who we are, who we have been, and who we want to be, to draw
out the tension within who we now are, and thereby to bring into question the practices that
shape our culture so as to make possible new ways to exist collectively.42

42

Cf. May who expresses this thematic of Foucault’s work well.

50
CONCLUSION
I have offered a novel, and yet straightforward, understanding of genealogical critique.
The key to my account is to understand the situated context in which the genealogist finds
herself, and from which the genealogist offers her genealogy. It is this normatively situated
context of the genealogist—and, more importantly, that of her audience—that provides a
perspective from which the elements of our culture that she analyzes can be revealed to be
dangerous—a dangerousness that will always be a danger for someone in particular. The
particular values she appeals to, however, are dispensable to her analysis. At the end of the day
all that is necessary for Foucault’s genealogies to criticize cultural practices is the historical
dissolution of their timeless status and the presence, within her audience, of any valuecommitment that threatens to conflict with these contingent historical practices. Foucault’s goal
is not to establish a timeless historical critique, but to offer a history that problematizes the
present.43
By way of conclusion, I will consider the import that this understanding of Foucauldian
critique can have on broader issues. First, I will make more explicit the contribution that
Foucault, on my reading, makes to critical philosophy. Then, I will point to the ways my reading
of genealogical critique can be seen to contribute to political theory. And finally, I will outline
how genealogical analysis can be a mode of social analysis that provides insights beyond those
of traditional sociology and conceptual analysis.
Philosophical Criticism: Between Transcendentalism and Relativism
The effort it has taken to articulate Foucauldian critique, and the coherence and
originality of the resultant mode of criticizing cultural practices, reveals the profound
43

31).

Or, to use Foucault’s own expression, he is offering “the history of the present,” (Discipline and Punish,

51
contribution Foucauldian genealogy can be seen to make to philosophical discussions of
criticism. As discussed in chapter one, Foucault considers a careful analysis of history to reveal
the contingency of norms that we often think of as transhistorical. Much effort to philosophically
criticize various positions has attempted to locate universal (or non-contingent) norms that can
serve as the ground for settling disputes of various sorts and attaining objective certainty (e.g.
epistemological, ethical, etc.). Foucault’s genealogies aim to show that the very norms that
would serve as a transcendental ground for critique are actually products of historical practices
(such as political institutions) and discourses (such as found in the sciences), which are, in turn,
products of earlier practices and discourses. By thus describing the history of present-day norms,
Foucault gives us reason to question the timeless status of these norms. And in order for the
critical philosopher to defend their universal, timeless status, she will have to appeal to
something other than the events of the past. But it is unclear how anything other than the study of
past events can show the timelessness (or timeliness) of any norm. Thus the genealogist puts the
critical philosopher in an awkward position of being unable to provide a non-question-begging
account of the timelessness of the would-be universally valid ground for critique. Moreover,
Foucault’s ability to account for a purely historical way in which these very norms are produced
threatens to undermine the certainty of any (question-begging or no) account the critical
philosopher can give of the universal grounds for critique.
It has been thought, however, that acceding to arguments such as those that Foucault’s
genealogies offer44 prohibits one’s ability to engage critically with one’s current norms. If one
opposes all attempts to provide a universal ground for criticizing practices within our culture, it
44

Foucault’s genealogies, of course, are not the only efforts that have been made to undermine the
universal (or objective) status of Kantian-style grounds for critique. He takes himself to be inspired, along with
others, by Nietzsche’s genealogy. (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith AnsellPearson, trans. Carol Diethe, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).)

52
seems difficult to understand how one could ever non-arbitrarily oppose, for example, hate
crimes against homosexuals. Insofar as critics of transcendental philosophy, such as Foucault,
are unable to offer an alternative basis for principled opposition, critical theorists can appeal to
their ability to do so as a reason to preserve their project.45
Therefore, my account of how Foucault’s orientation within the norms of the present
reveals Foucault to offer a genuine alternative to transcendental critique. My explication of
Foucault does more than just explain how we can understand Foucault to put forward a
consistent account, it also articulates an alternative mode of philosophical criticism—one that
does not rely on the problematic ascriptions of timelessness to norms that we currently find in
our historical epoch.
Political Theory: Between Metaethical Realism and Antirealism
Following very closely from the last point, Foucault’s genealogical critique also enables a
philosophical engagement with political issues without recourse to speculative metaethical
theory. Deliberation within political theory faces a very similar dilemma to that of critical
philosophy. On the one hand, disputes over the best way to structure political institutions rely on
normative notions like justice. For example, one way of arguing about how wealth ought to be
distributed within a society is to attempt to account for what distributions would be
commensurable with justice. But on the other hand, the notion of justice itself is always in
question. Thus, in order to offer persuasive proposals for, e.g., an economic distribution, it is
necessary to first address the question of the normative ground for values such as justice—i.e. it
is necessary to address the question of what makes (a particular conception of) justice universally
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(or quasi-universally, as with a historico-transcendental critique) binding. This latter question is a
question of metaethics.
The problem is that, much like in critical philosophy generally, metaethical arguments
that attempt to ground norms of justice face various forms of skepticism that put the universality
of would-be metanormative principles into question. And so, it would seem that those who
attempt to establish a universal normative ground for ethics (whom we might loosely call ethical
realists) are susceptible to opposition by Foucault’s anti-transcendental genealogy. But, at the
same time, those who oppose establishing a universal ground for justice (who we might call
ethical anti-realists) find themselves facing the difficult task of providing groundless norms for
political action. And, if they are unable to offer a persuasive alternative to the arguments of
ethical realists, then efforts to find a workable ground for justice remain desirable.
A good example of what I am calling an ethical realist position, or a transcendental
political theory, is John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. In this text, Rawls attempts to provide a
ground for norms of justice which accounts for the currently prevalent notions of justice and
allows room for criticizing present-day conceptions and practices. This ground is argued for by a
thought-experiment in which one abstracts away from the morally biasing particulars of one’s
life and attempts to establish principles of justice from this disinterested perspective.46 If
Foucault’s anti-transcendentalism is found to be persuasive, however, this sort of project is
doomed to question-begging metahistorical assumptions. Specifically, the parameters of the
hypothetical “original position” are, themselves, an articulation of many contingent norms that
already constitute our culture’s notion of justice (including that of obtaining disinterested
objectivity).
46
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A prominent example of an attempt to offer an anti-realist political theory is Richard
Rorty’s notion of solidarity. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty argues that the
normative contexts in which we find ourselves are wholly contingent. And by engaging in a
project of imagining other sorts of contexts in which one might participate (through a careful
engagement with literature and philosophy), Rorty thinks that one is able to distance oneself
from one’s own normative context and thereby escape potential ethnocentrism. However, in
order to account for the possibility of continued political activity (having a shared sense of
justice that enables us to have laws, obey them, enforce them, and generally cooperate as a
people), Rorty appeals to a formal notion of solidarity—any cluster of norms (specifically,
beliefs and values) that allows for a thinly shared context and thereby cooperation.47 But Rorty’s
robust anti-realist commitments—which he expresses as a sort of “postmodern virtue” called
“irony”—constantly threaten any basis we might find for shared political commitments (i.e.
solidarity). Without an explicit orientation within present-day social commitments, Rorty’s
attempts at solidarity threaten to be wholly arbitrary.48
Foucault does not attempt to settle the question of whether there are universal grounds for
justice. From his perspective, discourse regarding what is meta-right and meta-wrong is
susceptible to the same sort of historical analysis as the discourse regarding what is right and
47
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Ironically, this is exactly the sort of criticism Rorty thinks he can make stick to Foucault (see ibid, 6165). He criticizes Foucault in this way because, in short, he fails to appreciate Foucault’s normative enrootedness
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carve out careful spaces (usually surrounding the antagonist) for exploring horrifyingly cruel acts (consider, for
example, the movie Seven and the franchise of The Silence of the Lambs). These obvious counterexamples to
Rorty’s thesis suggest that he does not intend ground the disvalue of torture in literature alone. Rather, it is likely
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that I have described to underlie genealogical critique.
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wrong, allowed and disallowed. Rather than engage in metaethics, he attempts to problematize
attempts to gain access to universal grounds and provides an alternative analysis that puts the
particular norms of justice within our culture into question. Through an analysis of powerstructures and discourses of knowledge, Foucault can get behind the norms of justice within our
culture (thus doing better than, e.g., Rawls), explain their relation to larger social forces, and
orient these forces within the contingent normative context of his audience (thus doing one better
than Rorty). Therefore, my version of Foucault presents a viable alternative to political theory
that neither delves into transcendental arguments regarding the essence of justice nor disables all
bases for political commitments.49
Epistemology: Beyond Sociology and Conceptual Analysis
In addition to helping us understand and articulate the theoretical and political
contributions of Foucault, my reading of Foucault enables us to take seriously his social analysis
as a concrete alternative to traditional sociology and contemporary conceptual analysis when it
comes to understanding social structures, the norms they employ, and the ethical implications
they may bear. Foucault analyzes many subtle practices that exert force over persons’ bodies
within our culture. His goal is to identify patterns and trajectories in the way in which these
individual “micropractices” shape the behavior of both individuals and groups—a task which is
accomplished, in part, by analyzing the change of these practices and strategic patterns of
practices over time. This analysis of the overall operation of biopower is meant to do two things
for his readers: it is meant to (1) contribute to a positive understanding of the operation of the
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way cultural forces act on us and (2) situate this understanding so as to make possible and
motivate resistance to the particular operations that prevail in our culture currently.
My articulation of Foucault’s ability to perform the latter of these two functions of his
analysis—which is the critical element of his genealogical work—can also be carried over to
contribute to our understanding of the former function—the positive work of describing
operations of power within our current epoch. Foucault has attempted to show how the historical
operations of power within a particular cultural practice (such as psychoanalytic psychiatry), in
part, produce the positive knowledge that that practice produces in discourse (e.g. about the
importance of sex for self-formation) and are, also in part, produced by the knowledge already in
play within the relevant discourse (e.g. a pleasure-drive heuristic for explaining human
behavior).50 This insight is part of what allows him to show the constitution within history of
would-be metahistorical knowledge about sex and sexuality. But, as a matter of fact, the same
structures of power and discourse of knowledge provides the context in which Foucault is
writing his own academic work. This fact implies that Foucault’s positive discourse is
susceptible to the same sort of historical dissolution as his critical element.
Therefore, Foucault’s positive method of historical analysis (which includes a theoretical
understanding of the relation between knowledge and power) is historically, culturally, and
normatively situated. But, as with the necessarily situatedness of his critique, this should not be
taken as a criticism of Foucault. Foucault’s genealogical project is indeed thoroughly rooted
within a cultural understanding of the world and is invested with institutional power. But, as I
have argued in relation to his critique, this does not invalidate his discourse any more than it
invalidates that of any other. When he opposes various practices within our culture, he does not
oppose them merely because they have a (positively and normatively) situated position. He
50
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opposes their specific position from his specific position. And it is his audience that arbitrates, as
it were, between the two conflicting positions.
And this insight, which is essentially a restatement of the one I made in the last chapter
now applied to Foucauldian epistemology, is precisely the one so many commentators have
failed to realize.51 If we assume that Foucault’s criticism of other practices is based solely on
their historical contingency, then Foucault’s own discourse must be suspect to the same criticism.
But, if we recognize that Foucault’s objections interact with the particular commitments of his
audience, then we have no problem admitting the contingency of Foucault’s own claims to
factuality. The only “negative” result of this admission is that Foucault’s factual claims are as
susceptible to diminish in the face of either counter-genealogical analysis or the passing of time
as is his critical force. But, as I said before, for the genealogist to want more than that from his
positive analysis is to want something that cannot be achieved—metahistorical objectivity.
It follows from these implications that Foucault’s analysis of power, which extends far
beyond HS52 and has influenced a variety of more recent projects from others, can be taken
seriously as an alternative to various traditions within sociology and the conceptual analysis of
social norms. Moreover, I have articulated how Foucault is successful at critically orienting his
readers toward the subject of his analysis. This critical potential combined with the explicit
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situatedness of Foucauldian genealogy presents genealogy as a compelling alternative to (or at
least a strong variant of) sociological analysis.
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